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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES,
RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

A. Parties And Amici
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The following parties appeared in this matter m the
District Court below:
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1. Price Waterhouse, a partnership.

2. Ann B. Hopkins.
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The above-listed parties are parties to this action on
appeal. There were no intervenors or amici in the court
below.
B. Rulings Under Review

The rulings under review in this appeal are contained
in the Remedial Order and Final Judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia entered
on May 25, 1990 by District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell,
which is unreported and reproduced in the Appendix, at
252-53, and in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on Remand and accompanying Order entered by Judge
Gesell on May 14, 1990, which also are unreported and
reproduced in the Appendix, at 218-51.
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C. Related Cases

This case was previously before this Court in Hopkins
v. Price Waterhouse, Nos. 85-6052 & 85-6097 (consolidated). This Court's August 4, 1987 opinion is reported at
825 F.2d 458. The District Court 's 1985 Memorandum and
Order in Hopki ns v. Price Waterhouse, No. 84-3040 are
report ed at 618 F. Supp. 1109. This case also was before
the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of
certiorari, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167, and
the Supreme Court's May 1, 1989 decision is reported at
109 S. Ct. 1775.
A relate d case brought by plaintiff under the District
of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 1-2501, et.
seq., is pending in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia (Civ. Division), styled Hopki ns v. Price Waterhouse, No. 3469-84.
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BRIE F FOR APPELLANT

PERT INEN T STATUTES

The pertinent provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., are
reproduced in the Addendum to this Brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE S PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the District Court erroneously concluded that
Price Waterhouse failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have postponed for one year
a decision regarding plaintiff's partnership candidacy regardless of her sex.
2. Whether the District Court was required by the law
of the case doctrine to determine that plaintiff was constructively discharged by Price Waterhouse when she was
not reproposed for partn er notwithstanding its finding that
plaintiff's own intentional unreasonable conduct had itself
removed any possibility that she would be reproposed.
3. Whether the courts are authorized to compel the creation of a professional partnership as a remedy under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
4. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in
ordering Price Waterhouse to make plaintiff a partn er under the circumstances of this case.
5. Whether, even if Price Waterhouse is liable to plaintiff
under Title VII, plaintiff is entitled to any damages in
light of her own unreasonable conduct that prevented her
from becoming a Price Waterhouse partn er and her failure
to seek comparable employment elsewhere.
JURISDICTION

This Court's jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The District Court's jurisdiction was based upon 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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A. Nature of the Case and Procedural History
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C . § 2000e, et seq. Defendant
Price Waterhouse is a national professional partnership
engaged in accounting, auditing, tax, and management
consulting. Plaintiff Ann B. Hopkins was a Price Waterhouse employee whose 1982-83 candidacy for partnership
in the firm was deferred for further consideration the following year. She was not reproposed the following year
and subsequently resigned from the firm. She contends
that the 1983 deferral of her candidacy was influenced by
considerations of sex. She filed this action seeking admission to the partnership, back pay and attorn ey's fees.
After a nonjury trial in 1985, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985), the Di~ri ct Court
found that plaintiff had problems with her "interpersonal
skills" that provided a legitimate, nonpretextual basis for
deferring plaintiff's partnership candidacy " 'to afford time
to demonstrate that she has the personal and leadership
qualities required of a partn er.' " Id. at 1113. The court
also found, however, that Price Waterhouse had permitted
an unquantified level of "unconscious" sexual stereotyping
to play an "undefined role" in its partn er selection process.
Id. at 1118. The court held that "once a plaintiff proves
that sex discrimination played a role in the employment
decision, the plaintiff is entitled to relief unless the employer has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that the decision would have been the same absent discrimination .... Price Waterhouse has not done so.'' Id.
at 1120 (citations omitted).
The District Court found that although a flawed process
may have contributed to the initial decision to defer
plaintiff's partnership candidacy, the decision not to repropose her for partn er the following year was not discriminatory. 618 F. Supp. at 1114-15. It also found that
her subsequent resignation from the firm was voluntary
and did not constitute a constructive discharge. Id. at 1121.

-·
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Because she had not been constructively discharged, the
District Court determined that plaintiff was "not entitled
to an order that she be made partner" or "to any monetary relief for the period subsequent to her resignation."
Id. at 1121.
Both parties appealed. In August 1987, a divided panel
of this Court affirmed the District Court's decision as to
liability. The Court held that
bdth plaintiffs personality and the sexually stereotyped reactions to her personality were significant factors in the firm's decision to hold her candidacy.
Because Price Waterhouse could not demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that h:npermissible bias
was not the determinative factor, however, the District Court properly found for Hopkins on the question
of liability.
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 471-72 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). 1
Plaintiff had not appealed and the Court of Appeals did
not disturb the District Court's conclusion that Price
Waterhouse did not discriminate against plaintiff when it
decided not to repropose her for partner. However, the
Court found that plaintiff had been constructively discharged because the decision to defer her candidacy in
1983 "coupled with the ... failure to renominate her, would
have been viewed by any reasonable senior manager in
her position as a career-ending action." 825 F.2d at 473.
The Court remanded the case for the determination of
"appropriate damages and relief." Id.
The Supreme Court granted Price Waterhouse's petition
for certiorari. On May 1, 1989, the Court reversed this
Court's judgment of liability against Price Waterhouse.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). The
Court held that both this Court and the District Court had
erred in deciding that in a case where both permissible
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1 Judge Williams dissented from the panel's holding affirming liability,
observing that "the record here provided no causal connection between
Hopkins' fate and [sexual) stereotyping .... " 825 F.2d at 474.
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and impermissible factors had
contributed to an employment decision, a defendant cou
ld escape liability only by
proving by clear and convincin
g evidence tha t it would
have made the same decision irre
spective of gender . The
Court ruled tha t this showing
need only be made by a
preponderance of the evidence
and remanded the case so
tha t a determination could be ma
house's "proof was pre pon der antde whether Price Water." Id. at 1793.
Upon remand and aft er additional
evidence, briefing and
argument, the District Court rul
ed tha t Price Waterhouse
"ha[d] not met its bur den " und
er the preponderance of
the evidence sta nda rd and theref
ore was liable under Title
VII for its 1983 decision deferr
ing pla int iffs partnership
candidacy for one year. Fin din gs
of Fact and Conclusions
of La w on Rem and ("Findings")
, App. at 228. The court
rei ter ate d its original finding tha
propose plaintiff for partnership t the decision not to rethe following year was
not discriminatory and expressly
articulated tha t tha t decision was the result of plaintiff's
own "unreasonable intentional conduct." Id. at 240.
Nonetheless, the District
Court concluded tha t it had no cho
law of the case the previous con ice but to accept as the
clusion by the Court of
Appeals tha t plaintiff had been
constructively discharged
when she was not reproposed.
Id. at 231.
In determining the appropriate
ordered Price Waterhouse to admremedy, the court below
it plaintiff to its partnership as of July 1, 1990, id. at
233, 236-37, and awarded
back pay for the period July
1, 1984 through June 30,
1990 in the amount of $371,175
and reasonable atto rne y's
fees. App. at 252-53.
..-,. ~

On June 21, 1990, Price Waterh
ouse timely filed its
Notice of Appeal and Motion for
Stay in the District Court .
The District Court denied a sta y
on Jun e 25, 1990, "except
as to attorney fees." This Co
urt granted Price Waterhouse's request for a sta y of the
partnership order and
back pay award and expedited
the appeal.
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B. Statement of the Facts
Price Waterhouse provides services to corporate and
government agency clients throughout the United States.
825 F.2d at 461.LDespite its size, 900 partners in over 90
offices, Findings, App. at 235, it "has consistently sought
to maintain the traditional characteristics of a professional
partnership both in its management and partnership selection practices." 618 F. Supp. at 1111; Findings, App.
at 221, 234.
Partnership selection is a conscientious process undertaken by the partners through the firm's governing Policy
Board and its Admission Committee. It involves lengthy
written and oral evaluations, analysis and -discussion based
upon "well-identified written criteria." Findings, App. at
221. The court below found that twice as many candidates
are rejected or deferred each year as are accepted on first
consideration. Id. at 221-23.
Among the considerations that form an "important part
of Price Waterhouse's written partnership evaluation criteria," 618 F. Supp. at 1114, is the candidate's conduct
toward colleagues and subordinates. The District Court
found that a deficiency in this regard was "a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to admit a candidate
to partnership." Id. ·Because relationships among personnel
affects morale, attrition, and the capacity of the firm to
function with efficiency, the court below agreed that "Price
Waterhouse had every reason and legal right to come down
hard on abrasive conduct in men or women seeking partnership." Id. at 1120.
The admissions process in 1982-83 revealed serious deficiencies in plaintiff's interpersonal relationships. Nearly
two-thirds of the thirty-two partners that submitted written comments on plaintiff had objections to her conduct.
See App. at 37-49. A recurrent theme was at plain ·
was "extremely overbearing," "arrogant and self-centered," "universally disliked by the staff," and presented
a "risk that she may abuse authority." Id. at 37, 39, 43.
Plaintiff received more "no" votes than 85 of the other
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87 candidates in 1983 (618 F. Supp.
at 1116) and "more
negative comments tha n any other
candidate tha t year."
Findings, App. at 222. 2
The Chairman of the firm's Admissi
ons Committee testified:

,,,,., ..... .,,t,·. .

-'~~ . :

We did . . . talk with the par tne rs
throughout the
whole admissions process tha t knew
Ann Hopkins best.
We spoke with the par tne rs who had
dealt with her
on a day to day basis, par tne rs who
had known her
casually and the re was a basic und
erlying pervasive
theme in all of our discussions and
the responses tha t
came through the par tne r canvas
tha t she ... had
difficulty dealing with staff, relating
to both the part. ners, the peers within the [Office
of Government Services] group and the peers in other
offices she visited
and she had difficulty in relating
and leading and
developing staf f tha t worked for her
. . . [I]t was not
an isolated comment, but it was a
pervasive theme
tha t ... ran through a substantial num
ber of par tne rs
tha t had contact with her.
Findings, App. at 222-23. The firm
's Senior Par tne r and
Chairman of the Policy Board test
ified on remand tha t
"th e par tne rs generally believe tha
t Ann had a problem
in interpersonal skills and tha t as
a result she was evaluated evenhandedly." App. at 210.
The "Admissions Committee wavered
[plaintiffs] candidacy outright or plac between rejecting
ing
ultimately chose the hold option." Fin her on hold, but
dings, App. at 223.
The Policy Board adopted the Admissi
ons Committee's rec2 Plai
ntiff was the only woman candidate
in 1982-83. AB of July 1984
Price Waterhouse had seven wom
en partners. 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
The District Cou rt rejected plaintiff
's claim that "the small number of
women part ners at Price Waterhouse
indicates discrimination," id. at
1116, concluding that "[w]omen have
only recently entered the accounting and rela ted fields in large
numbers and ther e is evidence that
many potential women part ners wer
e hired away from Price Waterhouse by clients and rival accounting
firms." Id.; see also 825 F.2d at
464 n.2.
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ommendation that plaintiff be held " 'at least a year to
afford time to demonstrate that she has the personal and
leadership qualities required of a partner.' " 618 F. Supp.
at 1113. Price Waterhouse regularly held over candidates,
male and female, "because of concerns about their interpersonal skills .... " Id. at 1116.
The "hold" decision provided plaintiff a legitimate and
fair opportunity to become a Price Waterhouse partner:
[T]here is little reason to believe the hold was a cynical gesture; 16 of the 19 candidates placed on hold
with Ms. Hopkins in 1983 made partner in 1984, and
in her case the decision to hold her oyer appears to
have been a considered business decision that her talent justified giving her candidacy another look. It is
clear from the record that she was given a genuine
chance to demonstrate her ability to overcome her
differences in interpersonal relationships.
. ,;,;.

Findings, App. at 241-42.
The District Court found that plaintiff's "conduct provided ample justification" for the complaints that resulted
in the deferral of plaintiff's candidacy. 618 F. Supp. at
1114. However, the court also concluded that some of the
comments about her may have been "tainted by unarticulated, unconscious assumptions related to sex." Id. at
1118. Plaintiff's expert witness testified that women engaged in assertive behavior may be judged more critically
than males. While this witness "could not pinpoint the
degree to which stereotyping had influenced the selection
process" and was unable to state whether any "particular
reaction was determined by the operation of sex stereotypes," id. at 1117, the court found that "stereotyping
played an undefined role in blocking plaintiff's admission
to partnership in this instance." Id. at 1118.
After being informed of the decision in March 1983 that
her partnership candidacy would be held over, plaintiff
undermined her chances for a Price Waterhouse partnership. One partner who switched from a "hold" to oppo-
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sition did so because he found
plaintiff "disagreeable to
work with and had reservations
and dedication to the firm." Id. about her technical skills
at 1114. The District Court
found "no proof tha t his pos
ition was animated by animosity toward her sex." Id.
An important ally of plaintiff'
plaintiff's office and dep art me nt s and a key par tne r in
switched to opposition because of the following incident:
Soon aft er the hold decision, in
April 1983, Ms. Hopkins arranged a luncheon date
wit
of Government Services] partne h an OGS [Office
r, Donald Epelbaum.
The evidence is str on g that,
at tha t luncheon, Ms.
· Hopkins misstated the substa
nce of a meeting, held
a few days earlier, between
herself and Joseph E .
Connor, the Chairman and Sen
Waterhouse, regarding her par ior Pa rtn er of Price
tnership prospects. Ms.
Hopkins misleadingly implied
tha
disparaged certain par tne rs wh t Mr. Connor had
o opposed her candidacy and tha t he had warned
of
quences his par tne rs might exp the adverse conseher the next year. Mr. Epelbaum erience for opposing
felt immediately tha t
Ms. Hopkins had misrepresen
ted Mr. Connor's position, because he knew it was
not Mr. Connor's style
to att em pt to manipulate partne
rship decisions and to
disparage his partners to a non
-partner employee ... .
Ms. Hopkins' misrepresentation
of Mr. Connor's views
was a key factor influencing Mr
. Epelbaum to withdraw his previously strong sup
port of Ms. Hopkins.
Findings, App. at 240-41. The
Epelbaum "to be a credible District Court found Mr.
witness and accept[ed] his
account of these events." 618
F. Supp. at 1114.
As a direct consequence of pla
intiff's conduct aft er the
hold decision, she was not rep
roposed for partner. The
District Court found tha t the
dec
her was not discriminatory. 618 ision not to repropose
F. Supp. at 1115. Af ter
remand, the District added tha
t it was plaintiff's "unreasonable intentional conduct" tha
t was the cause of the
"nondiscriminatory decision not
to repropose ... . " Find-
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ings, App. at 240-41. Plaintiff's "own intentional conduct
materially prevented a fair test of her performance during
the hold period and ... she herself created a condition
which removed any possibility that she would be accepted
as partner after the hold." Id. at 242.
After she left Price Waterhouse in January 1984,
plaintiff "failed to make a reasonable effort to obtain similar employment . . . when opportunities elsewhere clearly
existed." Id. at 243. Although there was "a significant
demand both locally and nationwide for management consultants at Big Eight and other accounting firms, management consulting firms, and within large businesses,"
id., plaintiff "failed to make a reasonable~ conscientious
effort to work at her calling at a level available to her
which would satisfy her duty to mitigate damages." Id. at
243-44.

Consistent with her conduct at Price Waterhouse,
plaintiff continued to be her own worst enemy:
It appears from the evidence that she over-emphasized
her status in her own mind and chose work accordingly-firs t taking the risks of a new business venture
and then turning to the relatively noncompetitive atmosphere of government service. She was simply not
interested in the private sector except as a principal
[partner] and found no immediate or guaranteed partnership available among those who had more remunerative work to offer _jn --her field. So long as
partnership eventually remained somewhat conjectural, she was not interested. Vindication dominated
her thinking and kept her earnings below what she
could have earned by reasonable effort in her field.
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Findings, App. at 244.
Plaintiff made virtually no effort to seek a position leading to a partnership at another major accounting firm and
her conduct continued to undermine her career prospects.
For example, she abruptly walked out of a meeting with
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a par tne r of a "Big Eig ht" firm who
was willing to discuss
a senior manager level position
on
trac k' " toward partnership becaus a " 'relatively fast
e the proposal did not
offer an ins tan t partnership. Id.
at 245.
Plaintiff "ne ver formally applied for
a management consulting job at any firm," did "no
t send her resume" to
prospective employers, made "al
most no effort to work
with executive search firms," "rejec
ted at least two offers
of employment with smaller firms,"
and "made no genuine
try " to find a comparable positio
n. Id. at 245-46.
Instead of seeking out positions tha
t were or would lead
to employment comparable financi
ally and otherwise to a
Price Waterhouse partnership, pla
intiff went into business
for herself and, a few years late
r, for personal reasons,
she· abandoned her business and
went to work for the
World Bank, where she now earns
approximately $92,000
per annum. She could have found
stantially more but, "[f]or whate work tha t paid subver reason, she simply
chose not to seek such a position."
Id. at 247.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court below made four signific
ant errors tha t require reversal.
1. It was clearly erroneous to con
clude tha t Price Waterhouse had not proven by a prepon
derance of the evidence
tha t the Hopkins partnership can
didacy would have been
deferred regardless of plaintiff's
direct, widespread, consistent, andsex. The evidence was
largely uncontradicted
tha t plaintiff was abusive to sub
ordinates and generally
unpleasant to her peers. Those com
ments reflected a genuine and material deficiency in an
are a tha t was a legitimate criterion in the written Price
Wa
selection standards. And the par tne terhouse partnership
rs took the logical, reasonable and customary step for a
candidate in these circumstances: They held her over for
~o the r year to give
her an opportunity to overcome her
difficulties. However,
her temperament continued to fru
stra te her chances for
advancement, destroying her opportu
nity to be reproposed
for par tne r.
-....
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Neither the plaintiff nor the trial court even attempted
to weigh the mountain of gender-neutral criticisms of
plaintiff's interpersonal relationships against the few comments that may arguably have been the product of sexual
stereotyping. In fact, the analytical approach urged upon
and accepted by the court below did not involve weighing
the evidence at all. Instead, the court held that because
some of the comments about plaintiff may have reflected
stereotyping, all of them were presumptively invalid in the
absence of further explanation by the partners submitting
those comments or by expert testimony to the effect that
facially gender-neutral comments were indeed gender-neutral. By this convenient but entirely irrational process, all
the criticisms of plaintiff's "conduct" that the District
Court had once found to have provided '"ample justification" for the deferral of her partnership candidacy were
simply erased from the equation.
This approach elevated speculation above actual evidence. On the one side, there was serious and substantial
criticism of plaintiff's manner, incontrovertible evidence
that male candidates with similar problems were perceived
and treated similarly, and a continuing pattern of impulsive, aggressive, thoughtless behavior. The vast majority
of the criticisms of plaintiff did not mention her sex and
made no reference to any subject that could even arguably
be said to reflect sexual stereotyping. On the other side,
plaintiff presented literally nothing except the generalized
testimony of her expert that virtually any comment that
characterized plaintiff as abrasive, abusive or excessively
aggressive was suspect. But even plaintiff's expert could
not label most of the criticisms of plaintiff as demonstrably
tainted by stereotyping.
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Plaintiff's expert may have been enough to establish that
some unquantified measure of impermissible considerations
had been allowed to seep into the partnership selection
process and shift the burden of proof to Price Waterhouse.
But surely the trial court had the legal duty not to disregard the painstaking decisionmaking process that Price
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Waterhouse did apply and
the
vidual critical comments and host of unchallenged indiof other candidates tha t it evidence of equal tre atm en t
did produce. Had the court
below no t simply neutrali
zed all the concerns abo
ut
plaintiff's personality, it wo
uld have had no choice but
to
conclude tha t plaintiff's can
didacy, regardless of he r gen
der, would have been defer
red.
2. An egregious miscarriage
Court does no t correct the Dt of justice will result if this
str
clusion tha t it had virtually no ict Court's erroneous conchoice but to award plaintiff
a partnership and back pay
bec
vious sta tem en t "th at Ms. Ho ause of this Court's prepkins was constructively discharged when [the decision
was made] not to repropose
her [for pa rtn er. ]" Findings,
Court had squarely held aft App. at 231. The District
er the first trial tha t the decision not to repropose pla
intiff for partnership was no
t
connected with he r sex,
and was not discriminatory
.
Plaintiff did not even appeal
tha t finding. On remand, the
District Court rei ter ate d in
clear and unmistakable terms
tha t aft er the deferral, pla
int
chance" to overcome he r dif iff was given a "genuine
ficulties and to become a Pri
ce
Waterhouse pa rtn er. Plaintiff
alo
ne
des
tro
yed
tha
t
opportunity, "materially prevente
d a
ance," and "removed any po fair tes t of her performssibility" tha t she would be
made partner.

. --

,.-

The decision by the Court of
Appeals tha t the hold decision, "coupled with" the fai
lure to repropose plaintiff for
partner, constituted a construc
tive discharge was therefore
based on an incomplete or
erroneous reading of the tria
l
court's analysis of the decisio
n not to repropose. Furthermore, the holdover process wa
Price Waterhouse means of s an accepted and acceptable
correcting perceived deficiencies, not a death knell to a
candidate's partnership hopes
as the Court of Appeals err
oneously concluded.
The law of the case doctrine
did not compel the District
Court to accept the Court
of Appeals' constructive dis
charge decision because it wa
s pa rt of an opinion tha t was
vacated and not binding on
the District Court. Moreover
,
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for her when she, herself, was the principal
impediment
to the attainment of that goal.
Finally, if this Court determines that Price Wat
erhouse
is liable to plaintiff under Title VII, but agrees that
plaintiff
is not entitled to a Price Waterhouse partnership,
plaintiff's
recovery should be limited to atto rney 's fees and
back pay
for a limited period. In light of her failure
to mitigate
damages and even to seek a comparable posi
tion afte r
leaving Price Waterhouse, she is entitled to no
more.
ARGUMENT
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PRICE WATERHOUSE ESTABLISHED THAT
IT WOULD
HAVE DEFERRED PLAINTIFF'S PARTNERSH
IP
CANDIDACY REGARDLESS OF HER GENDER

The District Court erroneously concluded that
Price
Waterhouse had not established by a preponderanc
e of the
evidence that plaintiff's partnership candidacy
would have
been deferred regardless of her gender. The evid
ence was
substantial and manifestly preponderant that any
candidate
who had presented the record amassed by plain
tiff would
have been deferred wholly independent of any
other consideration. The Court below failed to weigh the
evidence;
had it done so, Price Waterhouse would have
prevailed,
and properly should prevail, on liability.
Price Waterhouse acknowledges that to the exte
nt the
District Court properly reviewed and weighed
the evidence, any challenge to the decision below will
be rejected
unless that decision was clearly erroneous. See,
e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
Although
it is a difficult standard, this Court has not hesi
tated to
overturn district court decisions when the clear
ly erroneous standard has been met. See, e.g., Palmer
v. Baker,
52 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1458, 1461
-62 (D.C .
Cir. 1990).
The clearly erroneous standard is considerably
less formidable, however, when a trial court has not actu
ally re-
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viewed and evaluated the evidence, see Underwood v.
District of Columbia Armory Bd., 816 F.2d 769, 775-76
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing factual finding where district
court appeared not to have weighed substantial evidence
at all), or has committed a legal error in the process of
doing so. Case v. Morrisette, 475 F.2d 1300, 1307-08 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (questions of law "do not find shelter in the
'clearly erroneous' requirement" and a "finding is 'clearly
erroneous' .. . if it was induced by an erroneous application
of the law"). In this case the District Court simply nullified
all of the evidence on one side of the evidentiary equation.
Thus, the District Court's judgment of liability against
Price Waterhouse must be reversed because its process
was erroneous as a matter of law. Alternatively, because
the District Court failed to give sufficient weight to Price
Waterhouse's evidence as a result of a thin and inadequate
generic challenge to that evidence by plaintiff, its judgment
of liability was manifestly and clearly erroneous.
The evidence was substantial and consistent that
plaintiff's interpersonal skills generate d complaints
throughout her career at Price Waterhouse that were
wholly unrelated to her gender. The Price Waterhouse
partnership selection process, described supra at 5, was
thorough and punctilious. It produced a widespread outpouring of negative comments and "no" votes. As the
District Court held, "the firm's practice of giving 'no'
votes great weight treated male and female candidates in
the same way." 618 F. Supp. at 1116.
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The vast majority of the negative comments regarding
plaintiff's "considerable problems dealing with staff and
peers," id. at 1120, had nothing to with gender and were
never identified by plaintiff, her expert witness, the District Court, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court
as containing any language that revealed sexual stereotyping. For example, one partner commented that plaintiff
is "just plain rough on people. Our staff did not enjoy
working for her. There is a risk that she may abuse authority." App. at 43. Another partner noted that plaintiff
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"can be abrasive, unduly harsh,
difficult to work with [and],
as a result, causes significant
turmoil." Id. at 42. 3
The record is replete with num
erous similar gender-neutral expressions of concern
over plaintiff's difficult relations with subordinates, peers,
comments were elicited indepe and with partners.• These
nde
ners in different offices based ntly from different partupon a variety of experiences with plaintiff at different
points in her career at the
firm. They were never shown
each other or related in any to have been influenced by
way other than the ir uniform
and intense focus upon pla
intiff's mistreatment of colleagues and subordinates.
Plaintiff's peers and subord
alleged to have been affected inates, who were not even
by
in the partnership selection pro any sexual stereotyping
cess, were equally forceful
about the difficulties involved
in working with and for
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These two par tne rs wer e call
ed as witnesses by Price Wa
terh ous e
during the 1985 trial and the
y testified as to the factual
bas es and
nondiscriminatory motivation
s for the ir comments. App. at
126-34; id.
at 147-69. The Dis tric t Co
urt' s blanket sta tem ent on
rem and tha t
none of "th ose par tne rs ma
king negative comments [have]
been presented for appraisal of the
motivations underlying their
com me nts ,"
Findings, App. at 227, simply
overlooked this testimony and
correct.
is in• See App. at 43 ("S taff does
not like working for her.");
id. at 44
("On occasion, she'll forget her
self [and] lose sensitivity for
sta ff."); id.
at 41 ("very abrasive in her
dealings with staff."); id. at
40 ("caused
a complete alienation of the staf
f ... [and] a fear tha t they wou
ld have
to work with Ann if we won
the project."); id. at 39 ("is
universally
disliked by the sta ff and ...
doe
or personal attr ibu tes tha t are s not possess the interpersonal skills
critical"); id. at 37 ("tended
to alienate
the staf f in tha t she was ext
remely overbearing"); id. ("c
an also be
abrasive in dealing with staf
f members"); id. (projected
"ar rog anc e
[and] self-centered attitude");
id. at 41 ("ra the r unpleasant
"); id. at 39
("interpersonal relationships
are extremely poor"); id. at 43
("still has
a few rough spots which nee
d
to demonstrate people skills") to be corrected"); id. ("needs a chance
; id. at 38 ("I believe Ann doe
s not possess
the leadership qualities we des
ire in our ptrs.").
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plaintiff, 5 and even female staff members who testified on
plaintiff's behalf pointed out that "her hard driving style
might be regarded as 'controversial' and that it required
'diplomacy, patience, and guts' to work with her." 618 F.
Supp. at 1114 & n. 5 (quoting Tr. 423, 434).
Plaintiff herself testified that she was "abrasive" and
"hard driving" (App. at 60-62) in dealing with staff. Price
Waterhouse also introduced "contemporaneous records of
counseling sessions conducted well before the plaintiff was
proposed for partnership [that] indicate that the partners
found her too assertive, overly critical of others, [and]
impatient with her staff .... " 618 F. Supp. at 1114 &
n.4; App. at 16-36. "At the time, plaintiff indicated that
she agreed with many of these criticisms." Id.
Price Waterhouse partnership "candidates are regularly
held because of concerns about their interpersonal
skills .... " 618 F. Supp. at 1116. Male candidates who
were as highly regarded as plaintiff in the area of technical
skills, business generation, and dedication to the firm were
either placed on hold or rejected outright because of interpersonal skills problems equivalent to or even less pronounced than plaintiff's. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 64; App. at
121-22. 6 Thus, for example, a male candidate who was held
• For example, one consultant employed by Price Waterhouse described plaintiff's manner as "abrupt" and insensitive" (App. at 136)
and testified that "it was tough dealing with Ann and I don't think
I've had that type of same tough experience prior to or after" working
with plaintiff. Id. at 144. There also was evidence that plaintiff manifested a "condescending attitude[ ]" toward staff assigned to her projects. Id. at 133. Working for her was "demeaning at times" (id. at
136) and one consultant testified that he felt Hopkins "looked down
upon" him. Id. at 137. One individual actually quit the firm in part
because he could not tolerate working with plaintiff (id. at 76-77), citing
an incident in which plaintiff had screamed obscenities at him for 45
minutes. Id. at 76.
• Price Waterhouse appended to its Brief on Remand a summary of
the files contained in Def. Ex. 64 of several male candidates whose
profiles were similar to plaintiff's. See App. at 172-91. This is seemingly
precisely the kind of "objective evidence" that the Supreme Court
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in high esteem by virtually every Pric
e Waterhouse partner with whom he had worked was "he
ld"
a "history of being tough and dogmat because he had
ic to the point of
causing problems with staf f and clients.
" App. at 172.

t

. ......-....

ri
'·
f

'· t:

1

Historical evidence established tha t Pric
trea ted male and female candidates with e Waterhouse
personal skills equally. Plaintiff was una deficient interble to undermine
or refute this evidence. After reviewing
the records of the
135 candidates (App. at 58-59) elected
to the partnership
during the three-year period 1982-84, 7
plaintiff could point
to only two candidates admitted in the
face of material
criticism of their interpersonal skills. 618
F. Supp. at 1115
& n.6. The District Court found tha t
"Price Waterhouse
had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reas
ons
ing between plaintiff'' and those two par for distinguishtners. Id. at 1115.
The decision of Price Waterhouse at
was only a one-year deferral of the Hopissue in this case
kins partnership
candidacy. Twenty-one of the candidates
in plaintiff's partnership class were rejected outright. 825
F.2d at 462. The
Admissions Committee "wavered," Fin
dings, App. at 223,
but ultimately chose the hold alternative.
found tha t the deferral was intended in The District Court
good faith to provide her with a '' genuine chance to dem
onstrate her ability
to overcome her differences in interperson
al relationships."
Id. at 242 . Most candidates held ove
r each year make
par tne r the following year. See id.
at
plaintiff a par tne r or rejecting her out 241-42. Making
right would have
contemplated should be considered in
determining whether the firm had
met its burden on the "sam e decision
" issue. See 109 S. Ct. at 1791;
compare NLR B v. Transportation Man
agement Corp., 462 U.S. 393,
396-97, 404 (1983) (when the "transgre
ssions that purportedly would
have ... prompted [the] discharge were
commonplace, and no transgressor had ever before received any kind
of discipline," employer failed
to meet burden of showing discharge
would have occurred absent antiunion animus).
7
"Pri ce Waterhouse made every documen
t generated by [its] admission process on candidates proposed
for admission in 1982, 1983 and
1984 available to the plaintiff during
the course of discovery in this
case." 618 F. Supp. at 1112 .
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been substantially irrevocable. A deferral, however, was not
permanent and it is not difficult to understand how even
materially lesser doubts about plaintiff's capacity to control
her own behavior would have justified a "hold" decision.
Finally, there was direct testimony in 1985 from the
Chairman of the firm's Admissions Committee and the
Chairman and Senior Partn er of the firm. They both testified unequivocally that it was plaintiff's actual conduct
in dealing with staff and peers, not sex stereotyping or
"discrimination in any way," 8 that led to the decision to
place plaintiff's candidacy on hold. As Justice White explained in his concurring opinion in this case:
In a mixed motive case, where the legitimate motive
found would have been ample grounds for the action
taken, and the employer credibly testifies that the
action would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof. This would
even more plainly be the case where the employer
denies any illegitimate motive in the first place but
the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate,
factors motivated the adverse action.

• . ">.._ , .,

109 S. Ct. at 1796 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Other than recalling the same witnesses that testified
at the first trial to repeat their testimony and recite once
again that their criticisms of plaintiff's conduct was not
motivated by sexual stereotyping, Price Waterhouse could
have done little more to satisfy its burden of proof.
The Supreme Court's mandate directed the District
Court to reweigh the evidence under the preponderance
of the evidence stand ard-"t he rock bottom at the factfinding level of civil litigation." Charlton v. Federal Trade
Commission, 543 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Preponderance of the evidence simply requires that a party prove
8
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a member of both the Admissions Committee and the Policy Board
also
testified to the nondiscriminatory basis of the decision . Id. at 121.
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tha t a fact is more likely tru e tha
n not. See 3 L. Sand,
J. Siffert, S. Reiss, J. Sexton & J.
Thorpe, Modern Federal
Jur y Ins tru ctio ns 1 73.01 (1990).
The District Court had already fou
nd tha t the factors
described above, including plainti
ff's "conduct," provided
"ample justification for the ... dec
isio
er plaintiff's
partnership candidacy. 618 F. Sup n" to def
p. at 1114.9 Plaintiff, on
the oth er hand, was able to point
to only a few of the
comments 10 as even arguably gen
der-related. He r expert
felt tha t any criticism of plainti
ff was illegitimate, but
could not isolate any particular
reaction as affected by
stereotyping. Id. at 1117. The Dis
trict Court itself found
it !'impossible" to identify any par
ticular negative reaction
as being motivated by plaintiff's
sex. Id. at 1118.
Plaintiff did not want the evidence
weighed on remand
and developed the argument tha t
it was "impossible" to
weigh the evidence because the
exi
typing in the process acted to disq stence of sex stereoualify all the comments.
See, e.g., Pl. Br. on Remand at 2-1
1. Any negative reaction
to plaintiff had to reflect stereot
ypical responses to an
aggressive woman.
The District Court apparently
accepted this theory.
Rather than reweighing the eviden
ce under a "less exacting sta nda rd" of proof (Findi
ngs, App . at 219), the
District Court reopened the issue wh
ether any of the firm's
concerns regarding plaintiff's inte
rpersonal skills were in
fact legitimate and nondiscriminatory
.
27 & n.6. It concluded tha t it cou See, e.g. , id. at 226ld not engage in an
evaluation of the evidence becaus
e Price Waterhouse had
"failed to separate out those com
ments tainted by sexism
9 The
Dist rict Cou rt simply walked awa
y from this finding by observ ing that it was included in the
port ion of the cou rt's opinion hav
ing
to do with whe ther the objections
to plaintiff wer e fabricated and not
in the port ion of the opinion hav
ing to do with sex stereotyping.
Findings, App. at 227 n.6. However, the
genuine complaints abo ut plaintiff
's
conduct wer e no less compelling
because of the Dist rict Cou rt's deci
sion
abo ut whe re to discuss them in
its opinion.
10
See 825 F.2d at 463.
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from those free of sexism," id. at 227, and because Price
Waterhouse had not "identif[ied] each sexually stereotyped
negative comment." Id. at 226. Thus, on remand the District Court did not analyze, evaluate, or weigh the evidence
at all.11
11
The District Court faulted Price Waterhouse for not producing additional evidence "in light of the lowered burden of proof," Findings,
App. at 220, particularly "to enable it to differentiate between all
sexually stereotyped comments and comments not influenced by stereotyping." Id. at 226. However, the plaintiff contended that the issue
on remand was the same as in the first case, only the standard of
proof had been changed, and "emphatically" opposed reopening the
record on liability. Tr. of Oct. 3, 1989 Hearing at 1-3. The Supreme
Court stated that a remand would permit the tri~l court to "determine
whether Price Waterhouse had poved" that it would have put the
plaintiff's candidacy on hold regardless of her gender. 109 S. Ct. at
1793 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); id. at 1806 (O'Connor, J .,
concurring in the judgment) ("On remand, the District Court should
determine whether Price Waterhouse has shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that if gender had not not been a part of the process"
it would have made the same decision). Thus, it is by no means clear
that it would not have been an abuse of discretion to reopen the
evidence on this issue on remand.

The Supreme Court also implied that subjective evidence in the form
of the employer's own testimony would be suspect. Id. at 1791 & n.14
(plurality opinion). And the Justices expressed considerable skepticism
regarding the need for or value of expert testimony to tell a court
whether comments reflect sex stereotyping. Id. at 1793 ("[i]t takes no
special training" to recognize sex stereotyping); see id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("in my view testimony such as
Dr. Fiske's in this case, standing alone, would not justify shifting the
burden"); id. at 1813 n.5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinions
cannot be read as requiring factfinders to credit testimony based on
this type of analysis."). As demonstrated in the text above, the evidence
in the record consisted of strong criticisms of plaintiff's conduct by
partners, colleagues, and subordinates, objective evidence of equal treatment of male candidates with similar problems and characteristics, a
continuing pattern of conduct by plaintiff that persisted even after the
deferral of her candidacy and after she left Price Waterhouse, and
direct testimony of partners in the firm that their concerns were addressed to plaintiff's conduct and not her sex. The record established
that plaintiff suffered from deficiencies in her interpersonal skills that
warranted, and would have led to, the hold decision irrespective of her
gender.
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The District Co urt 's approach
was manifestly erroneous
and unfair, and cannot be rec
onciled with the Supreme
Court's mandate in this case.
Price Waterhouse did not
have the burden on remand of
proving tha t its concern
with plaintiff's interpersonal ski
lls was nondiscriminatorythe firm had already establish
ed "th at Hopkins' interpersonal problems were a legitim
ate concern," 109 S. Ct. at
1792, and the sole issue on rem
and was whether this legitimate concern "st and ing alo
ne, would have induced it
to make the same decision." Id.
There was a preponderance of gender-neutral negativ
e comments as well as multiple additional factors, including
direct testimony from key
firm decisionmakers, tha t dem
onstrated tha t Price Waterhouse's "probable decision in the
absence of an impermissible motive," id. at 1791, wo
uld have been to place the
Hopkins candidacy on hold. Th
e District Court, however,
allowed the speculation of plaint
iff's expert to trump hard
evidence and to disqualify as
tainted every criticism of
plaintiff's "conduct" tha t in the
first trial it had found to
have been legitimate, understan
dable and ample. Because
some expressions of objections
to
have been improper, the Distric plaintiff's conduct may
t Court threw the baby
out with the bath water.
The District Court's rationale
cre ate s a peculiar Catch
22 for a defendant accused of
gender bias. Every criticism
of abusive conduct by a woma
example of judging a woman mon becomes ipso facto an
re critically "because aggressive conduct is viewed as
a masculine characteristic."
618 F. Supp. at 1118. Thus,
no such comment can be
proven to be legitimate becaus
e every such comment can
be characterized as "unarticu
late
tions related to sex." Id. In thi d, unconscious assumps world, a woman who is
disagreeable and abusive to sub
ordinates cannot be held
accountable for such behavior.
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II
THE DECISION NOT TO REPROPOSE PLAINTIFF
FOR PARTNER DID NOT RESULT IN A
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE

In considering an appropriate remedy, the District Court
found itself facing a , perplexing conundrum. The District
Court knew, and had twice expressly found, that while
sexual stereotyping may arguably have been a factor in
Price Waterhouse's initial decision to defer consideration
of plaintiff's partnership candidacy, discrimination had not
been responsible for plaintiff's ultimate failure to make
partner. That goal was put out of her reach by the deliberate and unreasonable conduct of the plaintiff herself. But
the Court of Appeals had inexplicably "coupled" (825 F .2d
at 473) the hold decision with the failure to repropose,
even though the former was found to have been tainted
by discrimination and the latter was not, and had held
that the two events taken together constituted a constructive discharge. Id. If this was the law of the case, and
beyond the District Court's ability to modify, then the
District Court felt that it had no alternative but to award
plaintiff a partnership even though the plaintiff herself had
created the condition that "removed any possibility" that
she could be partner.
In order to unscramble and analyze properly the events
leading up to the District Court's dilemma, it is necessary
first to review briefly what happened to plaintiff at Price
Waterhouse. As the District Court perceived it, a flaw in
the process that reviewed plaintiff's partnership candidacy
in the 1982-83 fiscal year contributed to the decision to
defer her candidacy for reconsideration the next fiscal year.
But holding a candidate for further consideration to the
next year was quite routine and most deferred candidates
made it successfttlly the next year:

___. ,.:, ~-·

... ...
. ..-.. -.,.._
•. -- ,,._
_

..... .
~

f

t .

_,

•·

[

-

...

-

..

'.
.,.
".j.

.

;, •

--:-

...

-;.

·.:_~_ ·-

. ,,

.

-·· ... ~: ,y - , •

-~;~-) :~~~!.

. ", ~t. :

.,·'

.-

-·

-: ~- -

iI

'._/ J "'f"

-~ -.. ' .. , .•
' --.·:. ··f;;

.

i

'
F
r -·
~-;

''; .;-r,- ~-~~-~

. I _.;:_ ~t

~-

I

,:;.i, ,. ' ·~.-_. . . . t:· ,_ .

:·--__ .
;

~

~

I_.•· .. ~-. '· ;.::

-··•.:. ~~-~--:-

-~,; !.:~ '.-~--:~

-- -'•

: ~f"'.,~

~

-\ ·-·---1 . _.., ·-::-: , ··

:.

,._,.. ••. ,

·, •.

·-

.....

__ ;~.r ~ ~

+·· •~ ··wJ:~:
··. ' ':•-~:~

A holdover was shown to be part of the process by
which the firm attempted to correct or minimize a
perceived deficiency. Indeed, 16 of the 19 candidates
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put on hold along with Ms. Hopkins in 1983 made
partner the next year.
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Findings, App. at 231 n.8. Thus, even if the hold decision
had been discriminatory, plaintiff was given a genuine,
good faith, nondiscriminatory opportunity to be a Price
Waterhouse partner. However, plaintiff was not reproposed for partner during the 1983-1984 cycle because she
alienated her supporters and took herself out of the running. Once she was not reproposed, her chances for a Price
Waterhouse partnership became slight, and, although she
was invited to stay on as a senior manager, she resigned
in January of 1984.
The District Court did not see these events as a constructive discharge because it did not feel that defendant
had driven plaintiff to quit by making her working conditions intolerable. However, the Court of Appeals saw it
differently. Redefining the law of constructive discharge,
the court focused on the fact that plaintiff's ambition was
to be a Price Waterhouse partner and that after she was
not reproposed, it had become " 'very unlikely' " that she
would ever become one. 825 F .2d at 472. The Court of
Appeals assumed that it was "the customary and nearly
unanimous practice" at Price Waterhouse and at other
firms for senior managers who have been passed over for
partnership to resign. Thus, according to the Court of
Appeals, because plaintiff had been pushed into a deadend, her departure was not voluntary and its circumstances
constituted a constructive discharge.
The problem with the Court of Appeals decision is the
presumption, contrary to the direct and unappealed finding
below, that the decision not to repropose was part of the
discriminatory process. If it had been, plaintiff may indeed
have been stalled in reaching her career objective as a
result of discrimination and a constructive discharge finding might have been understandable. However, only the
deferral decision was, even arguably, discriminatory. At
that point, plaintiff had a viable chance to make partner
and, as the District Court found, it most certainly was not

- -~{_rp·.-

.... -~---~J..--?~

.-.. s _,;:~\.,,;).:·:-:t~~·
..-...,;.i-'-,.:::-i;.,:;:H,;;

:
- - • '"'

:. . --.~.•._ .- ..:--1_:.:.,~~:..~.;:

~
- ~

"• . :.....- ~~

..

(-=-"11-

... ', . ·\ ;~}:~-~/
;

..

("

<r. :.:/ ~~-

25
-\. ·

l .

. .; . , ;

....· -,_,,.., ,._..

.

,

the custom of senior managers to leave after having been
"held." In fact, most of them stayed and made partner
the following year. Therefore, at the point of the deferral
decision, there was no colorable argument that plaintiff
had been constructively discharged. She was a viable candidate with a legitimate chance to succeed.
At this point, plaintiff pulled the plug on her own career.
She, not Price Waterhouse, caused herself not to be reproposed. Under these circumstances, a conclusion that
there had been a constructive discharge is plainly contrary
to the facts and law.
The plaintiff argued below, and the District Court
agreed, that since Price Waterhouse did not "appeal" the
Court of Appeals' constructive discharge decision, it is the
law of the case and, whether wrong or not, was binding
on the court. But that is not correct.
After the Supreme Court reversed the judgment against
Price Waterhouse on liability, this Court issued an order
vacating both its August 4, 1987 "mandate" and the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case to the
District Court for "further proceedings." App. at 171. In
this Circuit, the "mandate" of the Court of Appeals "consist[s] of .. . the Court's opinion and judgment." City of
Cleveland v. Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344,
347 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977).12 Thus, when this Court vacated
its mandate, it automatically and necessarily vacated its
August 4, 1987 opinion in this case, and necessarily
stripped the opinion of any precedential effect at later
stages of the proceedings. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975). 13
"This Circuit does not utilize a formal document called a mandate.
Rather the Clerk issues a certified copy of the judgment and the opinion
. .. of the Court in lieu of mandate. The rules and the Court's orders
refer to that document as 'the mandate.' " Handbook of Practice and
Internal Procedures, XII (2) (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1987) (emphasis added).
See App. at 170.
1
• Prior to the 1990 trial on remand, and even during that trial,
plaintiff conceded that this Court had vacated its 1987 opinion: "We
12
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Moreover, even if, as the District Court found, this Court
did not intend to vacate its earlier opinion, "the doctrine
of the law of the case 'is not an inexorable command that
rigidly binds a court to its former decisions but rather is
an expression of good sense and wise judicial practice.' "
Melong v. Micronesian Claims Commisswn, 643 F.2d 10,
17 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation omitted); see Sa.fir v. Dol,e,
718 F.2d 475, 481 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Application of
the doctrine is in any event discretionary"), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1206 (1984). This Court has recognized that where
"adherence to the law of the case will work a grave injustice," Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 642 F.2d 578,
585 (D.C. Cir. 1980), or " 'the [previous] decision was
clearly erroneous," Melong, 643 F.2d at 17 (citation omitted), a departure from the law of the case is justified and
appropriate. See also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,
618 n.8 (1983).
This is such a case. The District Court's second opinion
has made clear that it was plaintiffs own ''unreasonable
intentional conduct" that " 'locked [her] into a position
from which she could apparently obtain no relief,' " 825
F.2d at 472 (quoting Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1174
(D.C. Cir. 1981)), not any discriminatory conduct on the
part of Price Waterhouse. Therefore, it is not legally or
factually correct that plaintiff was constructively discharged when the partners of Price Waterhouse decided
not to repropose plaintiff for partner. Since the District
Court's partnership order is substantially predicated upon
its assumption that this Court's constructive discharge ruling left it no choice but to order partnership in this case,
that assumption should be set aside and the issue of the
appropriate remedy should be reconsidered.

recognize that [the Court of Appeals'] opinion was vacated following
the Supreme Court's decision . .. ." Pl. Pretrial Br. On Remedy, at 5
(Jan. 17, 1990). See also 1990 Tr. at 86 ("we think that [the Court of
Appeals' decision] had be[en] vacated.").
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TITLE VII DOES NOT EMPOWER COURTS TO COMPEL
PARTNERSHIP AS A REMEDY

The question whether federal courts have authority under Title VII to compel individuals to form a partnership
is an issue of first •impression. Indeed, no federal court
has ever created a partnership to remedy a Title VII violation. However, the court below inexplicably determined
that its authority to create a partnership was "firmly established" by the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). B~t the plaintiff in
Hishon did not seek a partnership. Therefore, the issue
was not before the Court. Id. at 72. The "narrow holding"
(id. at 78 n.10) in Hishon that "in appropriate circumstances partnership consideration may qualify as a term,
condition, or privilege of a person's employment" for purposes of Title VII does not establish the power of courts
under Title VII to create professional partnership relationships.
Title VII expressly applies only to "employment" arrangements and makes "reinstateme nt or hiring of employees" an available remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(emphasis added). There is nothing in Title VII to suggest
that it was intended to authorize courts to transform simple employment relationships into partnerships, or to order
individuals to become partners once their employment relationship has been terminated.
A. Title VII Does Not Authorize Partnership As A
Remedy

"As in all cases involving statutory interpretation," the
Court must "look first to the language of the statute itself." Hughey v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1979, 1982
(1990); e.g., Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., No. 89-624 (U.S. June 21, 1990); Moore v. District
of Columbia, No. 88-7003, slip op. at 5-7 (D.C. Cir. May
9, 1990) (en bane). The plain language of Title VII makes
clear that Congress did not intend to authorize the courts
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to create par tne rsh ips to remedy
employment discrimination.
Title VII prohibits "unlawful em
ployment practices for
an employer ." 42 U.S.C. § 200
0e-2. Section 2000e(b) defines an "employer" as a "pe rso
n . . . who has fifteen or
more employees" and § 2000e(a)
defines the term person
to include " par tne rsh ips ." Section
ployee as "an individual employed 2000e(t) defines an emby an employer." The
sta tut e's remedial section provid
es, in pertinent part:
If the cou rt finds tha t the respon
dent has intentionally
engaged in . . . an unlawful em
ployment practice .. .
the court may enjoin the respon
dent from engaging
in such unlawful employment pra
ctice, and order such
affirmative action as may be app
ropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, rei
nstatement or hir ing
of employees, with or withou
t bac
oth er equitable relief as the cou k pay . . . or any
rt deems appropriate.
42 U.S .C. § 2000e-5(g) (emphasis
added). Title VII speaks
only of orders tha t require the
"hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion of an individual as an
employee . . .. " Id. (emphasis added) A partnership ma
y be an employer because
Title VII expressly says so, but
ployee because a par tne r is not a par tne r is not an em"an individual employed
by an employer."
As Justice Powell observed in
a concurring opinion in
His hon "[t]he relationship am
ong . . . par tne rs differs
markedly from tha t between em
ployer and employee." 467
U.S. at 79-80 (footnote omitted).
A partnership is a volunt ary and intentional "associati
on of two or more persons
to car ry on as co-owners a busine
ss for profit." Unif. Par tnership Act § 6 and official com
ment, 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969). 14
u " 'A part ners hip is gen
erally said to be created when
persons join
tog ethe r thei r money, goods, labo
r, or skill for the purpose of carr
ying
on a trade, profession, or busines
s and when there is community
of
inte rest in the profits and losses.'
" Bur ke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d
867,
869 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Com
missioner v. Tower , 327 U.S. 280
, 286
(1946)).
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The "essence of the partnership is the common conduct
of a shared enterprise." Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell,
J., concurring).
On the other hand, an "'employee,' according to all
standard dictionaries, according to the law as the courts
have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone, ... means someone who works for another
for hire. . . . 'Employees' work for wages and salaries under direct supervision.' " Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local Unum 1 v. Pittslrurgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 167 (1971) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 18 (194 7)) (emphasis deleted). 15
This Court is " 'bound to assume that the legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used.' " St. Agnes Hospital v. Sullivan, No. 89-5144, slip
op. at 7 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1990) (quoting INS v. CordozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)). Congress authorized
the courts to reinstate, hire, or promote employees, as
employees, into employment positions. 16 It did not empower the judicial creation of partnerships.
15 In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Court concluded that Congress did
not intend "the term 'employee' ... to be stretched beyond its plain
meaning embracing only those who work for hire," and held that retirees are not "employees" for purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA"). The Court in Hishon relied upon Pittsburgh Plate Glass,
noting that the "meaning of [the NLRA's] analogous language sheds
light on the Title VII provision at issue here." 467 U.S. at 76 & n.7.
Because "nothing in the legislative history of [Title VII] explicitly addresses the definition of employee," Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825
F.2d 257, 263 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987), the Court's
approach in Pittsburgh Plate Glass is especially instructive in this case.
1• Section 2000e-5(g) also states that a court may order "any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." However, "[i]n light
of the principle of ejusdem generis-that a general statutory term should
be understood in light of the specific terms that surround it-the catchall phrase should not be read to introduce" partnership into the Title
VII remedial scheme. Hughey, 110 S. Ct. at 1984; see, e.g., Federal
Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734 (1973)
(holding that "catch-all provision" is "to be read as bringing within a
statute categories similar in type to those specifically enumerated"),
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A contrary reading of the statute would be illogical.
Justice Powell in Hislwn pointedly emphasized that "the
Court's opinion should not be read as extending Title VII
to the management of a . . . firm by its partners. The
reasoning of the Court's opinion does not require that the
relationship among partners be characterized as an 'employment relationship to which Title VII would apply." 467
U.S. at 79. Thus, "[t]o date, courts have shown no disposition to extend [Title VII] to general partners. " Wheeler
v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 263 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987). For example, in Wheeler, the
court noted that the "requirem ent that [Title VII] cover
only employment situations suggests that Congress perceived a need to limit the application of [the] statute," id.
at 276, and concluded that Title VII does not apply to the
relationship among partners.17 It is submitted that, if Title
VII does not apply to the relationship among partners, it
cannot reasonably be interpret ed to authorize the courts
to order individuals to create and enter into a partnership
relationship and to supervise that relationship thereafter.
The history and purposes of Title VII do not suggest
otherwise. Although the legislative history of the statute
speaks in broad terms about the "wide discretion" to fashion equitable remedies vested in the district courts, the
drafters of the statute did not mention partnership or
other specific relief unrelated to employment as a remedial
alternative. 18
affg, 460 F .2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The specific, express statutory
language necessarily restricts the jurisdiction of the courts to equitable
relief relating to employment relationships.
11
See also Burke v. Friedman, 556 F .2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (rejecting
argument that "partners can be regarded as employees rather than as
employers who own and manage the operation of the business" under
Title VII.); EEOC No. Dec. 85-4 (Mar. 18, 1985) (partners who are
"not employed by the partnership ," but "rather . . . are the co-owners
who control and manage the business" cannot "be considered em•
ployee[s] under Title VII"). Plaintiff has conceded that Title VII does
not apply to the relationship among partners. Appellee's Opp. to Mot.
for Stay at 5 n.3.
18 See, e.g., Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, The Equal Em-
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Title VII seeks to "make persons whole for injuries [of
an economic character] suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). However, ordering that
an employee be transformed into a partner, rather than
reinstated as an employee and reconsidered for partnership, "catapult[s] [the employee] into a better position than
[she] would have enjoyed in the absence of discrimination."
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 234 (1982). Moreover, the "'general rule'" expressed in Albemarle that
"'[t]he injured party is to be placed, as near as may be,
in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had
not been committed,' " 422 U.S. at 418-19, is no more
than the traditional rule of contract damages, 19 and the
award of monetary relief fully redtesses any "economic
injury" caused by discriminatory conduct. See id. at 41719.
The District Court seemed to feel that the size and
diversity of Price Waterhouse diminished its interest in
judicial selection of its partners. Findings, App. at 23435. However, the size of a particular partnership does not
convert partners into employees. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at
273. Had Congress intended to create a definitional distinction based upon the number of partners in a firm, it
undoubtedly would have done so expressly, as it did when
it defined the term "employer" on the basis of the number
of its employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
Finally, courts of equity historically have refused to decree the creation of partnerships because of the necessarily
personal relationship between co-owners of a joint business
enterprise and the inherent difficulties of monitoring a
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ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7168 (1972);
H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 2391, 2405 (section-by-section analysis).
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 & comment a (1981) ("Contract damages . . . are intended to give [the injured party] the benefit
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of his bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent
possible, put him in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract been performed.").
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partnership decree. 20 Title VII should not be read to eliminate implicitly the common law prohibition against compelling partnership in equity. See, e.g., Copel,and v.
Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 989 & n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
B. The Court Should Interpret The Statute to Avoid
Constitutional Infirmities
Even if this Court were to be persuaded that Title VII
could be construed to authorize the judicial creation of
partnerships, the Court should avoid such a construction
because it would raise serious constitutional questions under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It is a " 'wellestablished principle that statutes will be interpreted to
avoid constitutional difficulties.' " Webster v. Re-productive
Health Services, 109 S. Ct 3040, 3054 (1989).
As Justice Powell recognized in Hishon, "impediments
to the exercise of one's right to choose one's associates
can violate the right of freedom of association protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 467 U.S. at
80 n.4. Indeed, the Supreme Court "has long recognized
that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a
substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State." Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); Board of Directors of Rotary
20
See, e.g., Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661,
668-69 (1st Cir. 1984) ("few principles are more fundamental to our
jurisprudence than the general prohibition against specific performance
of personal service contracts . . . and there is a strong presumption
against specific performance of a .. . partnership"). Accord Karrick v.
Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 335 (1897) (a court "will seldom, if ever,
specifically compel . . . performance of a [partnership contract], the
contract of partnership being of an essentially personal character");
Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 550-51
(1937) ("Equity will not decree the execution of· a partnership agreement since it cannot compel the parties to remain partners"); Hyer v.
Richmond Traction Co., 168 U.S. 471, 482 (1897) ("it would seem like
a contradiction to force antagonistic parties to fo~ a partnership").
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Club, International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545
(1987) ("freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of
the liberty protected by the Bill of Rights"). The Court
also has "recognized that the right to engage in activities
protected by the First Amendment implies 'a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends.' " Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548.

.,

These two closely related aspects of associational freedom-freedom of intimate association and freedom of expressive association, respectively-are both implicated
directly by the District Court's partnership decree: "There
can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal
structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that
forces the group to accept members it does not desire."
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
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Professional partnerships, which, like Price Waterhouse,
are highly selective, personal, and intimate, are entitled
to consideration under constitutional protections from undue governmental intrusion. 21 The choice of a partner is
far more personal and permanent a commitment than the
"choice of one's fellow employees," Roberts, 468 U.S. at
620, and an interpretation of Title VII that treats as in-
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The size of a partnership does not, in and of itself dissipate these
qualities. The District Court found that Price Waterhouse had consistently striven "to maintain the traditional characteristics of a professional partnership." 618 F. Supp. at 1111. Moreover, a partner need
not know intimately every one of his or her partners to share common
goals, risks, standards, ambitions and loyalties. Price Waterhouse partners consider partner status to have an intrinsic special value quite
apart from any purely commercial concerns. E.g., App. at 169 (the
Senior Partner of the firm would never "demean his partners to a
senior manager. He holds that bond too high."); id. at 130. The District
Court's position that Price Waterhouse "lacks the intimacy and interdependence of smaller concerns, so concerns about freedom of association have little force," Findings, App. at 235, suggests incorrectly
that members of large organizations are ineligible for protection of
their associational freedoms. That is not the law. Cf NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
21
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terchangeable the creation of partnerships and
the relationship between employers and employees calls
into question the constitutional validity of the statu te's
remedial
provisions. The text of Title VII unambiguously
"adm its
of a less problematic construction." Public Citiz
en v. Department of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2567 (198
9). This
Court should adopt it to avoid these serious cons
titutional
difficulties.
IV
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISC
RETION
IN ORDERING PARTNERSHIP IN THIS
CASE

I

1l
i
j
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Even if it had the authority to do so in an appr
opriate
case, the District Court committed reversible
erro r when
it ordered Price Waterhouse to admit plaintiff as
a part ner
under the peculiar facts of this case. The cour
t created a
"strained partnership relationship," Findings, App
. at 237,
based upon the "ill-defined" theory of sex stere
otyping,
id. at 249, despite evidence from most of the
part ners who
evaluated plaintiff that she did not pass a legit
imate Price
Waterhouse criterion for partnership, and notw
ithstanding
that her own "unreasonable intentional" conduct
deprived
her of "any possibility" of making part ner when
she was
given a fair and unbiased opportunity to mak
e part ner.
Id. at 240-41. Ordering a partnership under such
circumstances cannot reasonably be characterized as
an appropriate exercise of equitable discretion under Title
VII, even
if the statu te authorizes such relief.
It would be particularly inappropriate to force
Price
Waterhouse part ners to accept into a professional
and collegial part ners hip someone who suffered
from an
"[i]nability to get along with staff or peers." 618
F. Supp.
at 1114. Indeed, the courts often refuse to
order reinstatement in cases in which, due to interpersonal
that remedy will result in disruption of sensitivedynamics,
relationships, friction, or antagonism. 22
.,, See, e.g., Cassino v. Reichlwld Chemicals, Inc.,
817 F.2d 1338, 1347
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Plaintiff abused and subverted her legitimate opportunity to make partner by engaging in counter-productive
and self-destructive conduct. It would be ironic and unjust
for the courts to create for her the remedy that her own
conduct placed beyond her reach. Moreover, her deliberate
refusal to seek employment that would have led to a comparable partnership in another firm also disqualifies her
from seeking from the courts that which she could have
obtained on her own had she not violated her legal duty
to mitigate her damages.
V

PLAINTIFF'S RELIEF, IF ANY, MUST BE LIMITED
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND BACK PAY FOR
A LIMITED PERIOD
If this Court determines that Price Waterhouse is liable,
but agrees that plaintiff is not entitled to a Price Waterhouse partnership, plaintiff's relief must be limited to
attorney' s fees and back pay for a limited period. Plaintiff
had a legal duty to mitigate her damages. She failed even
to make the slightest effort to obtain a position among
the plethora of comparable opportunities available to her.
She did not do any of the things that the law would have
required. Therefore, her monetary relief must be limited
to back pay for the period between the time of the deferral
of her partnership candidacy and when she could have
attained a similar position had she made reasonable efforts
to do so. See Sangster v. United AirLines , Inc., 633 F.2d
864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981)
(failure to mitigate cuts off right to back pay).
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); McIntosh v. JC>'MS
Truck Lines, Inc., 767 F.2d 433, 435 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1985); EEOC v.
Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)(refusing to reinstate executive beeause the position required a
"close working relationship between plaintiff and top executives of
defendant"), affd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 920 (1977); Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1309, 1321 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (rejecting reinstatement
of executive because, "a person in an executive or management position
must have the complete confidence of others in management").
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Plaintiff's refusal to make reasonable efforts to mitigate
her damages forecloses the availability of "front pay" to
compensate for any future losses. Dominic v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1257-58 (2d Cir. 1987) (failure
to mitigate precludes the availability of front pay); Hansard v. Pepsi Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 865 F.2d
1461, 1470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 129 (1989).
"[F]ront pay is intended to be temporary in nature," Cassino, 817 F.2d at 1347, and "the plaintiff's duty to mitigate [damages] must serve as a control on front pay
damage awards." Id. Plaintiff's relief, if any, should be
restricted to damages for the period ending when she
would have made partner at Price Waterhouse had she
not made that impossible or, at most, for the two or three
years that it would have taken her to make partner or
attain the equivalent position at another firm.
CONCLUSION
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Plaintiff's conduct as a Price Waterhouse employee, including her propensity to abuse authority and intimidate
subordinates, standing alone, would have resulted in a decision to defer her partnership candidacy in 1983. Price
Waterhouse has invariably denied or deferred partnership
for men and women under these circumstances. Therefore,
the judgment of liability against Price Waterhouse should
be reversed. However, if the Court does find that Price
Waterhouse is liable to plaintiff, she is not entitled under
the law or the facts of this case to a partnership and she
should recover no more than back pay for the period between the time of the deferral of her partnership candidacy
and the date when she could have become a partner had
she not prevented it by her own conduct or attained a
position similar to a Price Waterhouse partnership had she
taken reasonable steps to do so.
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